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INTRODUCTION
Reverse payment settlements have ignited a firestorm debate
among all affected parties: consumer groups, brand-name
pharmaceutical companies, generic manufacturers, pharmaceutical
wholesalers and retailers, lawmakers, executive agencies, and the
federal courts. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has waged
a decade-long battle against such private settlements of
pharmaceutical patent litigation as illegal market-sharing
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agreements,1 with skirmishes among the circuits trending in favor
of the settling parties2 until recently.3 The Third Circuit’s recent
decision in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation unsettled this trend,4
and the Supreme Court granted the FTC’s petition for a writ of
certiorari in a separate case on the issue on December 7, 2012.5
A reverse payment settlement is an agreement ending a
pharmaceutical patent infringement suit under which a putative
patent holder agrees to compensate an alleged infringer, typically a
generic firm, to settle a patent infringement case.6 In exchange, the
alleged infringer agrees not to challenge the patent holder’s patent
or sell a generic version of the drug for a stated term.7 Because the
payment flows from the plaintiff to the defendant, it has been
called a “reverse” payment.
This Note argues that any standard of antitrust review for
reverse payment settlements must involve an evaluation of the
patent’s strength at the time the patent holder and generic firm
enter into a settlement. The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is the court of competent jurisdiction to review a district
court’s evaluation of a patent’s strength. Part I reviews reverse
payment settlements generally and the statutory schemes that
promote their emergence. Part II presents three approaches the
circuit courts have adopted to review reverse payment settlements:
per se illegality, a rebuttable presumption of illegality, and the
scope of the patent test. Part III argues that any standard of
antitrust scrutiny must consider the patent’s strength at the time of
the settlement—an approach no circuit has yet adopted—and that

1

FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST
CONSUMERS BILLIONS: AN FTC STAFF STUDY, at 1 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 FTC
STUDY], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf (“‘Payfor-delay’ agreements are ‘win-win’ for the companies: brand-name pharmaceutical
prices stay high, and the brand and generic share the benefits of the brand’s monopoly
profits.”).
2
See infra Part II.B.
3
See infra Part II.C.
4
686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).
5
F.T.C. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted
sub nom. F.T.C. v. Actavis Inc., 81 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-416).
6
See infra Part I.A.
7
See infra Part I.A.
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the Federal Circuit is the proper appellate court to review patent
strength.
I. BACKGROUND: REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS AND THE
STATUTORY SETTING
To understand the debate over the propriety of reverse payment
settlements in the pharmaceutical industry, one should be familiar
with the statutory provisions that regulate FDA approval of new
and generic bioequivalent drugs. One should also understand the
basic antitrust law principles enshrined by the Sherman Antitrust
Act (the “Sherman Act”), and how they interact with basic patent
law principles under the pharmaceutical industry’s unique
regulatory approval scheme.
A. Reverse Payment Settlements
A reverse payment settlement is a resolution between disputing
parties in a pharmaceutical patent infringement suit under which a
putative patent holder agrees to compensate an alleged infringer to
settle a patent infringement case.8 In exchange, the alleged
infringer agrees not to challenge the patent holder’s patent or sell a
generic version of the drug for a stated term.9 Because the
payment flows from the plaintiff to the defendant, it has been
called a “reverse” payment.10 More “evocatively,”11 the FTC has
referred to these settlements as “pay-for-delay” agreements.12
The FTC has filed lawsuits and published studies censuring
these settlements since 2001,13 arguing that they are unreasonable

8

JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33717, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT
LITIGATION SETTLEMENTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION AND INNOVATION, at 1 (2010),
available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/574.
9
See THOMAS, supra note 8.
10
See THOMAS, supra note 8.
11
Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 625 F.3d 779, 780 (2d Cir.
2010).
12
See generally 2010 FTC STUDY, supra note 1.
13
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Pay-for-Delay: When Drug Companies Agree Not to Compete,
FTC RESOURCES FOR REPORTERS, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/reporter/competition/
payfordelay.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2012).
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restraints of trade in violation of federal antitrust laws.14 Other
commentators have argued that the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,15 commonly referred to as
the Hatch-Waxman Act, created an incentive scheme that
encourages such settlements.16 As of this writing, Congress has
not articulated a test for determining whether reverse payment
settlements implicate antitrust laws, although both chambers have
introduced bills attempting to proscribe such agreements.17
Congress’s failure to enact a policy has effectively left the question
for the federal courts to decide,18 and six circuits have addressed
whether reverse payment settlements are legal.19 On December 7,
2012, the Supreme Court granted the FTC’s petition for a writ of

14
See, e.g., Brief of the FTC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants and Urging
Reversal at 13, In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10-2077,
10-2078, 10-2079), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/05/110518amicusbrief.pdf
(“Because such an agreement closely parallels market allocation arrangements
universally recognized as unlawful, a presumption of antitrust illegality is justified.”);
Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 26, King Drug Co. of Florence v. Cephalon, Inc., 702
F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (Civil Action Nos. 2:06-cv-1797, 2:06-cv-1833, 2:06-cv2768, 2:08-cv-2141), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0610182/080213
complaint.pdf (“Through its course of conduct, Cephalon has excluded competition and
willfully maintained its monopoly . . . by compensating its potential competitors and
abusing competitive and regulatory processes.”), abrogated by In re K-Dur Antitrust
Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3090 (Aug. 24,
2012) (No. 12-245), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3090 (Aug. 29, 2012) (No. 12265).
15
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15,
21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
16
See F.T.C. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Federal
law encourages generic drug manufacturers to file paragraph IV certifications.”), cert.
granted sub nom. F.T.C. v. Actavis Inc., 81 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12416). See generally Kent S. Bernard & Willard K. Tom, Antitrust Treatment of
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Need for Context and Fidelity to First
Principles, 15 Fed. Cir. B.J. 617 (2006).
17
Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act, H.R. 1706, 111th Cong. (2009);
Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. (2009). Both bills died.
The House reintroduced the Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act in the
112th Congress. H.R. 3995, 112th Cong. (2012). The Senate reintroduced the Preserve
Access to Affordable Generics Act in the same Congress. S. 27, 112th Cong. (2012).
Both bills died again.
18
THOMAS, supra note 8, at 2.
19
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 209.
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certiorari to review the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit in F.T.C.
v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.20
B. The Statutory and Regulatory Landscape
Before reviewing the three main approaches to evaluating
reverse payment settlements, it is necessary to understand the
statutory provisions that regulate FDA approval of new and
generic bioequivalent drugs and to review the basic antitrust
principles enshrined by the Sherman Act. The pharmaceutical
industry’s unique regulatory scheme has given rise to a unique
tension between antitrust law and patent law in that industry.
1. The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984
Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act (“Hatch-Waxman”
or the “Act”) in 1984 to achieve two seemingly disparate
objectives—specifically, (1) to increase the availability of low cost
generic drugs, and (2) to increase incentives for innovation in the
pharmaceutical industry.21 Three particular provisions in the Act
advance the first objective, while three more advance the second.22
But before reviewing each, a brief overview of the FDA approval
process before 1984 is apposite.
Before Hatch-Waxman, a generic firm could not legally
develop a generic version of a brand-name drug until the
innovator’s patent expired.23 Once the innovator’s patent did
20

677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 81
U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-416).
21
H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 14–15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647,
2647–48; see also Presidential Statement on Signing the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 225 (Sept. 24, 1984)
(announcing that “[t]he legislation will . . . make the generic versions [of brand-name
drugs] more widely available to consumers[] and grant pharmaceutical firms added
incentives to develop new drugs”).
22
See Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for
Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 41–45 (2009) [hereinafter Carrier,
Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements].
23
See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
superseded by statute, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
(Hatch-Waxman Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (codified at 35
U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006)), as recognized in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d
402, 406 (Fed. Cir. 1989), aff’d, 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
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expire, federal food and drug law required the generic firm to
obtain FDA approval to market the drug by filing an extensive
“New Drug Application” (“NDA”).24 The FDA’s safety and
efficacy requirements often required generic firms to coordinate
“needlessly costly, duplicative and time-consuming” clinical trials
that largely eviscerated the benefit of manufacturing and marketing
cheap generic drugs.25 As a result, “[s]ome observers noted that
although patents on important drugs had expired, manufacturers
were not moving to introduce generic equivalents for these
products.”26 In fact, in 1984, generic drugs made up only 18.6
percent of the prescription drugs sold in the United States.27
Hatch-Waxman significantly eroded these statutory and regulatory
obstacles to generic drug market entry.
a) Promoting generic competition
i. The “safe harbor” provision
Title II of the Act amended the Patent Act of 1952 and created
a “safe harbor” provision for the use of a patented invention
“solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information” to the FDA.28 This provision carefully
expanded lawful uses of a patented invention to include testing that
would allow a generic manufacturer to establish generic
bioequivalency.29 The exemption legislatively overruled Roche
Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., which had held that a
24

WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30756, PATENT
LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984 (“THE HATCHWAXMAN ACT”), at 20 (2005), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/
crsreports/crsdocuments/rl3075601102005.pdf.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, at 27 (1998)
[hereinafter CBO STUDY].
28
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).
29
See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(II), at 8 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686,
2692 (“[T]he only activity which will be permitted by the bill is a limited amount of
testing so that generic manufacturers can establish the bioequivalency of a generic
substitute. The patent holder retains the right to exclude others from the major
commercial marketplace during the life of the patent. Thus, the nature of the interference
with the rights of the patent holder is not substantial.”).
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generic firm’s experimental use of a patented invention for
business reasons was “a violation of the rights of the patentee to
exclude others from using his patented invention.”30 Roche had
effectively required generic manufacturers to delay generic
bioequivalency tests until the patentee’s patent expired,31 which
would result in a de facto patent extension32 of about two years
after the expiration of the patent.33 In overruling Roche, Congress
noted that the safe harbor provision “was essential to implement
the policy objective of getting safe and effective generic substitutes
on the market as quickly as possible after the expiration of the
patent.”34
Two Supreme Court decisions have since interpreted the safe
harbor provision, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), as broadly as
possible.35 In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., the Court held
that the safe harbor provision exempts not only drugs, but the
range of patented inventions covered by the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), including medical devices, food
additives, color additives, new drugs, antibiotic drugs, and human
biological products.36 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.
further expanded the scope of the safe harbor, holding that
preclinical studies of patented compounds that were not ultimately
submitted to the FDA were protected so long as they were
“reasonably related to the development and submission of any
information under the FDCA.”37 The Court noted that unprotected
30

Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
superseded by statute, Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585,
1603 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006)), as recognized in Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402, 406 (Fed. Cir. 1989), aff’d, 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
31
See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(II), at 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2692
(“Without [the Section] generic manufacturers would be required to engage in these
bioequivalency tests after the expiration of the patent.”).
32
Daniel Wobbekind, Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA: Re-Examining the
Broad Scope of the § 271(e)(1) Safe Harbor, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 107, 107 (2008).
33
See H.R. REP NO. 98-857(II), at 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2692 (“This
would result in delays of about two years after the expiration of the patent before a
generic could go on the market.”).
34
Id. at 9.
35
See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990); Merck KGaA v. Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
36
496 U.S. at 673–74; see also 35 U.S.C. § 156(f) (2006).
37
545 U.S. at 202 (emphasis added).
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uses would include “[b]asic scientific research on a particular
compound, performed without the intent to develop a particular
drug or a reasonable belief that the compound will cause the sort of
physiological effect the researcher intends to induce.”38 Thus the
safe harbor provision extinguished the patent holder’s de facto
extension of patent rights beyond the patent term39 and, as
interpreted by the Court, carved out room for trial and error in
generic drug development.40
ii. The Abbreviated New Drug Application
Title I of the Act, which amended the FDCA, introduced a new
type of application for generic firms seeking FDA approval of a
drug, termed the Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”).41
Under an ANDA, generic manufacturers who establish that a
proposed drug has the same active ingredient(s), route of
administration, dosage form, and strength, among other things, as
an innovator’s previously approved NDA, can rely, or
“piggyback,”42 on the FDA’s finding of safety and efficacy for that
drug.43 While an ANDA need not contain “duplicative testing
requirements” showing a proposed drug’s safety and efficacy,44 it
must contain information proving bioequivalence to a previously
approved drug.45
38

Id. at 205–06.
B. Scott Eidson, How Safe Is the Harbor? Considering the Economic Implications of
Patent Infringement in Section 271(e)(1) Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 1169, 1172 (2004);
see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 46 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647,
2678–79 (“It is the Committee’s view that experimental activity does not have any
adverse economic impact on the patent owner’s exclusivity during the life of a patent, but
prevention of such activity would extend the patent owner’s commercial exclusivity
beyond the patent expiration date.”).
40
Merck, 545 U.S. at 206.
41
21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006). A similar abbreviated process existed for prescription
drugs approved before 1962. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 14–15 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647–48; see also CBO STUDY, supra note 27, at 3.
42
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003).
43
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A).
44
CBO STUDY, supra note 27, at 43.
45
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv). A drug is considered “bioequivalent” to a previously
approved drug if:
(i) the rate and extent of absorption of the drug do not show a
significant difference from the rate and extent of absorption of the
listed drug when administered at the same molar dose of the
39
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The applicant must also certify that (1) the NDA holder has not
filed patent information with the FDA (Paragraph I); (2) the NDA
holder’s patent has expired (Paragraph II); (3) the NDA holder’s
patent will expire on a certain date (Paragraph III); or (4) the NDA
holder’s patent is invalid or the ANDA applicant’s proposed drug
will not infringe it (Paragraph IV).46 The FDA may immediately
approve an ANDA certified under Paragraphs I or II.47 The FDA
cannot approve an ANDA certified under Paragraph III until the
patent expires.48
A Paragraph IV certification is an act of patent infringement
under the Hatch-Waxman Act.49 An ANDA applicant making a
Paragraph IV certification must notify the patent and NDA
holder(s) within twenty days.50 The notice must include a detailed
statement of the factual and legal basis of the applicant’s opinion
that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed.51 If the patent
holder does not file a patent infringement suit within forty-five
days, the FDA may approve the ANDA immediately.52 If the

therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental conditions in either
a single dose or multiple doses; or
(ii) the extent of absorption of the drug does not show a significant
difference from the extent of absorption of the listed drug when
administered at the same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient
under similar experimental conditions in either a single dose or
multiple doses and the difference from the listed drug in the rate of
absorption of the drug is intentional, is reflected in its proposed
labeling, is not essential to the attainment of effective body drug
concentrations on chronic use, and is considered medically
insignificant for the drug.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(B).
46
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
47
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(i); see also F.T.C. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298,
1303 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 81 U.S.L.W. 3216
(U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-416).
48
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(ii); see also Watson, 677 F.3d at 1303.
49
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2006). See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S.
661, 678 (1990) (“That is what is achieved by § 271(e)(2)—the creation of a highly
artificial act of infringement that consists of submitting an ANDA or a paper NDA
containing the fourth type of certification . . . .”).
50
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B).
51
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv).
52
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
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patent holder files a timely claim, it receives an automatic thirtymonth stay of FDA approval.53
If before final judgment or the expiration of the thirty-month
stay the FDA approves the proposed generic drug, the approval is
tentative.54 Such an approval becomes effective the earlier of
when (1) the thirty-month stay expires; (2) the court rules the
patent is invalid or has not been infringed; or (3) the court enters a
settlement order or consent decree stating that the patent is invalid
or has not been infringed.55 If the court decides the patent is valid
and has been infringed, the FDA delays approval of the ANDA
until the patent expires.56
If the court has not resolved the patent litigation before the end
of the thirty-month period, the ANDA filer may begin marketing
the drug, but assumes the risk that it may be found liable if the
court eventually rules the patent is valid and infringed.57
Alternatively, the NDA holder and ANDA applicant may settle the
suit before final judgment.58 The Hatch-Waxman Act does not
prohibit settlements.59
iii. The 180-day exclusivity period
The Hatch-Waxman Act encourages generic manufacturers to
file Paragraph IV certifications (“ANDA-IVs”) and risk the cost of
ensuing litigation by rewarding the first firm to file an ANDA-IV

53

Id. Some commentators have likened the stay to an automatic preliminary
injunction. E.g., 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS & MARK A. LEMLEY, IP AND
ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW § 15.3 (2010), available at 2010 WL 3999073.
54
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); 21 C.F.R. 314.105(d).
55
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
56
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(II).
57
See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 740, 744
(E.D.N.Y. 2001) (“It seems relatively clear, however, that if there is no resolution of the
patent litigation and a stay is not granted, and the patent holder has not obtained
preliminary injunctive relief, the ANDA filer may begin to market its product. In such an
instance, the ANDA filer assumes the risk it might be found liable for infringing the
pioneer manufacturer’s patent.”).
58
See THOMAS, supra note 8, at 8.
59
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j).
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with 180 days of generic marketing exclusivity.60 During this
period, the FDA cannot approve another ANDA-IV for the drug.61
The exclusivity period begins to run when the first applicant who
submits a “substantially complete” ANDA-IV begins
commercially marketing its drug.62
Until 1998, the FDA took the position that the 180-day
exclusivity period was available only to first filers who
successfully defended patent infringement suits.63 Under this
interpretation, first filers who were not sued for patent
infringement were ineligible for the exclusivity period.64 The D.C.
Circuit overturned the FDA’s “successful-defense” requirement as
inconsistent with the plain language of Hatch-Waxman in Mova
Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Shalala.65 According to Mova, the statute
clearly provided that the 180-day exclusivity period began on the
earlier of the date of the first filer’s first commercial marketing of
the drug, or, as the statute provided at the time, the date of a court
decision finding the patent to be invalid or not infringed.66 The

60

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); William J. Newsom, Exceeding the Scope of the
Patent: Solving the Reverse Payment Settlement Problem Through Antitrust Enforcement
and Regulatory Reform, 1 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 201, 206 (2009).
61
Id.; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS: SHORT-TERM
EFFECTS AND LONG-TERM IMPACT, at i (2011) [hereinafter 2011 FTC STUDY], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/08/2011genericdrugreport.pdf (“[W]hen the [first filer]
challenges the brand’s patent, the FDA may not approve any additional generic
competitors until 180 days after the first-filer launches its product.”).
62
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I). But, “[i]f multiple applicants file substantially
complete ANDAs with Paragraph IV certifications on the same day as the first to do so,
those applicants can share exclusivity.” Erika Lietzan & David E. Korn, Issues in the
Interpretation of 180-Day Exclusivity, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 49, 55 (2007).
63
See 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c)(1) (1994).
64
Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
65
Id.
66
See id. The statute stated in relevant part:
If the [ANDA] contains a [paragraph IV certification] and is for a
drug for which a previous application has been submitted under this
subsection continuing [sic] such a certification, the application shall
be made effective not earlier than one hundred and eighty days
after—
(I) the date the Secretary receives notice from the applicant under the
previous [ANDA] of the first commercial marketing of the drug
under the previous [ANDA], or
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court reasoned that “Congress may have intended to reward the
first ANDA applicant for his enterprise whether or not he is later
sued.”67 Indeed, when Congress amended Hatch-Waxman as part
of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003, it provided that the 180-day
exclusivity period begins solely on the date of the first commercial
marketing of the drug by any first applicant.68
Marketing exclusivity is “a bounty worth hundreds of millions
of dollars for a major drug.”69 In fact, “generics often make more
than half of their total profits on a drug during the period of
generic exclusivity.”70 And the opportunity for 180 days of
marketing exclusivity, in addition to the availability of the ANDA
process and safe harbor protection, has helped fundamentally
transform the pharmaceutical industry. In 1996, twelve years after
Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act, the share of generic
units sold domestically more than doubled from 18.6 percent to

(II) the date of a decision of a court in [a patent infringement action]
holding the patent which is the subject of the certification to be
invalid or not infringed,
whichever is earlier.
CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 180-DAY GENERIC DRUG EXCLUSIVITY UNDER THE HATCHWAXMAN AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 2 (1998)
(quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (1994) (amended 2003)), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/.../Guidances/ucm079342.pdf.
67
Mova, 140 F.3d at 1071 n.11.
68
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (2006); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c)(1) (2012).
The statute now reads:
[If an ANDA-IV] is for a drug for which a first applicant has
submitted an application containing such a certification, the
application shall be made effective on the date that is 180 days after
the date of the first commercial marketing of the drug . . . by any first
applicant.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (2006).
69
C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1560 (2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
70
C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug
Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 948 n.3 (2011).
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42.6 percent.71 Today, generics represent approximately 80
percent of all drug units sold.72
b) Promoting innovation in the pharmaceutical industry
i. Patent term extension
Before 1962, innovators needed only to demonstrate a drug’s
safety to obtain FDA approval.73 Unless the FDA rejected the
NDA, the innovator could begin marketing the drug sixty days
after submitting its application.74 Congress amended the FDCA in
1962 to require an NDA to prove the proposed drug’s safety and
efficacy.75
Proving efficacy requires additional years of clinical trials.76 A
“showing of efficacy requires that the drug be investigated in
controlled clinical trials by multiple groups, and that these trials,
when subjected to a statistical analysis, prove the drug to be
efficacious.”77 Because innovators conduct most clinical testing
after a patent issues,78 the new efficacy requirement shortened the
innovator’s “effective patent life”—the time between FDA
approval and patent expiration.79 In response, pharmaceutical
research and development declined significantly to make up for

71

CBO STUDY, supra note 27, at 43.
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), 2012 Industry
Profile, at 2 (2012), available at http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/159/
phrma_industry_profile.pdf.
73
Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 22, at 43.
74
Stephanie Greene, A Prescription for Change: How the Medicare Act Revises
Hatch-Waxman to Speed Market Entry of Generic Drugs, 30 J. CORP. L. 309, 313 (2005)
(citing Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(explaining § 505 of the FDCA, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1052 (1938)), superseded by statute,
Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (codified at 35
U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006)), as recognized in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d
402, 406 (Fed. Cir. 1989), aff’d, 496 U.S. 661 (1990)).
75
Id. (citing Roche, 733 F.2d at 864 (explaining the Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub.
L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780)).
76
See Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 22, at 43.
77
Lee S. Wilkinson, Legal Resolution of Denial of Access to Medical Technology, 14
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 203, 244 (1984).
78
Roche, 733 F.2d at 864.
79
Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 22, at 44.
72
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increased costs and reduced returns.80 Many scholars have referred
to this post-1962 decline in new chemical entities and other new
drugs as the “innovation crisis.”81
To restore innovation after the 1962 amendments, the HatchWaxman Act introduced a procedure to extend patent terms.82
Innovators may now request patent term extensions from the
Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”) within sixty days of FDA approval.83 The PTO follows
four steps to calculate the total period eligible for extension84: (1)
identify the innovator’s “regulatory review period,” composed of
the innovator’s testing and approval phases after the patent
issues;85 (2) reduce each phase by the amount of time that the FDA
finds the applicant did not exercise due diligence in obtaining

80

Id. at 43–44 (citing John R. Virts & J. Fred Weston, Returns to Research and
Development in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, 1 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON.
103, 110 (1980)). Carrier notes that “[b]efore the 1962 amendments, the effective patent
life nearly matched the 17-year patent term. By 1981, it had fallen to less than seven
years.” Id. at 44 (citing James J. Wheaton, Generic Competition and Pharmaceutical
Innovation: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35
CATH. U. L. REV. 433, 451–52 (1986)).
81
Id. at 43.
82
See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006); see also PhotoCure ASA v. Kappos, 603 F.3d 1372,
1374 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting that § 156 “was designed to restore a portion of the patent
life lost during the period of regulatory review, in order to preserve the economic
incentive for development of new therapeutic products” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I),
at 37 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2670)). Section 156 interprets
“products” as any drug product, medical device, food additive, or color additive subject
to regulation under the FDCA. 35 U.S.C. § 156(f)(1). In addition to extending patent
terms for products, § 156 also extends patent terms for methods of using a product and
methods of manufacturing a product. 35 U.S.C. § 156(a).
83
35 U.S.C. § 156(d)(1).
84
See FDA: SMALL BUSINESS ASSISTANCE: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON THE
PATENT TERM RESTORATION PROGRAM, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapproval
process/smallbusinessassistance/ucm069959.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2012) [hereinafter
FDA FAQS ON PATENT TERM RESTORATION].
85
See 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(1)(B); 35 U.S.C. § 156(c); see also FDA FAQS ON PATENT
TERM RESTORATION, supra note 84. The testing phase is “the period between the
effective date of an investigational product exemption (Investigational New Drug
Application) and the initial submission of the marketing application (New Drug
Application). The approval phase is the period between the submission and approval of
the marketing application.” FDA FAQS ON PATENT TERM RESTORATION, supra note 84.
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regulatory approval;86 (3) take one-half of the adjusted testing
phase and add it to the adjusted approval phase to arrive at the total
eligible period for extension;87 and (4) cap the extension at five
years88 and the remaining term of the restored patent following
FDA marketing approval at fourteen years.89
Some commentators have openly doubted whether HatchWaxman’s patent term restoration provision delivers a real benefit
to pharmaceutical innovators. In a prepared statement for a
hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Gerald J.
Mossinghoff, then President of the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”), explained that “the net
effect of Hatch-Waxman has been a deterioration in intellectual
property protection for pharmaceuticals.” Mossinghoff cited as
primarily responsible “the many restrictions placed on the patent
term restoration period,” the availability of the streamlined ANDA
for FDA approval of generic drugs, and the statutory safe harbor
from patent infringement.90
86
35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(1). Due diligence means “that degree of attention, continuous
directed effort, and timeliness as may reasonably be expected from, and are ordinarily
exercised by, a person during a regulatory review period.” 35 U.S.C. § 156(d)(3). The
FDA assists the PTO by filing due diligence petitions and appearing at due diligence
hearings. See FDA FAQS ON THE PATENT TERM RESTORATION, supra note 84.
87
35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(2).
88
35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(A).
89
35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(3); WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RS21129, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT TERM EXTENSIONS: A BRIEF EXPLANATION, at
2
(2002),
available
at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/
crsdocuments/RS21129.pdf.
90
A Decade Later: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 121–22 (1996) [hereinafter
Hearings] (statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff, President, Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America). Mossinghoff cited the results of a Boston Consulting Group
study to support his proposition:
Before Hatch-Waxman, the typical innovator drug enjoyed a total of
14–17 years of market exclusivity—nine years of effective patent life
plus a five- to eight-year period between patent expiration and the
marketing of a generic copy. As a result of Hatch-Waxman, the total
period of intellectual property protection has shrunk to 11.7 years—
since generic drugs can now enter the market immediately after
patent expiration. Thus, the net practical effect of Hatch-Waxman
was to reduce the period of intellectual property protection for
innovator drugs by periods that range from 2.3 to 5.3 years.
Id. at 121.
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Other commentators say the patent term extension “has been
successful in increasing the patent term.”91 But drug patent terms
alone do not provide a full picture. Before Hatch-Waxman, brand
companies enjoyed effective market exclusivity after their patent
terms expired for a five- to eight-year period between patent
expiration and the marketing of a generic copy.92
Thus,
Mossinghoff, and commentators like him, argue that the safe
harbor provision and ANDA process shortened the innovator’s “de
facto” monopoly in lieu of a shorter, de jure patent term extension.
Evidently, the benefits of Hatch-Waxman’s patent term restoration
are disputed.
ii.

Non-patent marketing exclusivity for new chemical
entities
The Hatch-Waxman Act amended the FDCA to provide nonpatent marketing exclusivity periods to listed drugs that introduce
new active ingredients,93 or “new chemical entities.”94 The FDA
defines a new chemical entity (“NCE”) as “a drug that contains no
active moiety that has been approved by FDA” in a previous NDA
application.95 An “active moiety,” in turn, is “the molecule or ion,
excluding those appended portions of the molecule that cause the
drug to be an ester, salt . . . or other noncovalent derivative . . . of
the molecule, responsible for the physiological or pharmacological
action of the drug substance.”96
Under this provision, the FDA may not approve an ANDA-IV
for the first four years after NDA approval, and it may not approve
an ANDA with Paragraph I, II, or III certifications for the first five
years.97 The provision benefits innovators who discover new
active ingredients by “restrict[ing] a potential generic manufacturer

91

Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 22, at 50.
See Hearings, supra note 90, at 121 (statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff, President,
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America).
93
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2006).
94
21 § C.F.R. 314.108(a).
95
Id.
96
Id. (emphasis added).
97
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b).
92
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from bringing a product to market for five years plus the length of
the FDA review of the generic application.”98
iii. The thirty-month stay of FDA approval
An ANDA-IV applicant must provide a notice statement within
twenty days to each patent holder that is the subject of the
Paragraph IV certification and NDA holder on whose NDA the
applicant relies.99 The notice must “include a detailed statement of
the factual and legal basis of the opinion of the applicant that the
patent is invalid or will not be infringed.”100 To trigger a stay of
FDA approval of the generic firm’s ANDA, the patent holder must
initiate a patent infringement suit within forty-five days of
receiving the ANDA filer’s notice.101 During this period, the
generic cannot enter the market.102
FDA approval of the ANDA becomes effective after thirty
months unless the patent expires before then or a district court
earlier decides that the patent is invalid or not infringed, in which
case approval is effective on the date a court enters judgment in
favor of the generic.103 The thirty-month stay approximates the
length of a patent case to reach final judgment,104 and has been
compared to an automatic preliminary injunction because it
provides the patent holder “an absolute, although time-limited,

98

CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32917, BIOTERRORISM COUNTERMEASURE
DEVELOPMENT: ISSUES IN PATENTS AND HOMELAND SECURITY, at 11–12 (2006), available
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32917.pdf (“The purpose of NCE exclusivity is to
encourage the development of innovative drug products that include an entirely new
active ingredient (commonly termed the ‘active moiety’), in contrast to ‘me-too’ drugs
that consist of chemical variants of previously known compounds.”).
99
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i)–(ii).
100
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv).
101
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
102
See id.
103
Id.; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY at ii (2002) [hereinafter 2002 FTC STUDY], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf (“Filing of the lawsuit stays FDA’s
approval of the ANDA until the earliest of: (1) the date the patents expire; (2) a
determination of non-infringement or patent invalidity by a court in the patent litigation;
or (3) the expiration of 30 months from the receipt of notice of the Paragraph IV
certification.”).
104
See id. at 47. Patent cases take several months longer on average to reach final
judgment on appeal. Id.
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right to exclude a competitor from the market” without any
showing that the patent holder will likely prevail on the merits.105
2. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003
In 2003, Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act (the “Medicare Act”),
amending the Hatch-Waxman Act.106 The Medicare Act remedied
several of Hatch-Waxman’s “statutory design bugs,”107 which had
permitted litigants’ abuse of the thirty-month stay and 180-day
marketing exclusivity period.108
a) Eliminating abuse of the thirty-month stay of FDA
approval
Before the passage of the Medicare Act, several NDA holders
used an apparent loophole in the Hatch-Waxman Act to obtain
successive thirty-month stays of FDA approval.109 After a generic
firm filed an ANDA-IV, the NDA holder could list with the FDA
additional patents in connection with the NDA.110 The late-listed
patents required the ANDA applicant to file additional
certifications.111 Because each certification triggered a statutory

105

Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust
Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 514–15 (2007).
Traditionally, a patentee seeking a preliminary injunction must show: “(1) that it has
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance
of hardships between the plaintiff and the defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and
(4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” eBay Inc.
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
106
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 and 42
U.S.C.), amended by Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
107
See Michael Abramowicz, Orphan Business Models: Toward a New Form of
Intellectual Property, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1390–91 (2011).
108
See Greene, supra note 74, at 349.
109
Id. at 331. Prior to the 2003 amendments, Hatch-Waxman had not expressly
proscribed such stacking. Id. at 317.
110
See id.
111
See id.
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act of infringement, the brand firm could stack multiple thirtymonth stays.112
Infamously, GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) exploited this loophole
after a generic manufacturer, Apotex, challenged GSK’s listed
patent for the active ingredient in Paxil in 1998.113 After Apotex’s
initial Paragraph IV certification, GSK listed nine additional
patents for the drug with the FDA.114 Apotex filed additional
Paragraph IV certifications for each.115 GSK brought four
additional patent infringement suits against Apotex, resulting in an
effective five-year stay on FDA approval for a generic version of
the antidepressant.116 The Medicare Act closed this loophole by
allowing only one thirty-month stay for patents listed with the
FDA at the time the generic firm files an ANDA-IV.117
b) Eliminating abuse of the 180-day exclusivity period
Before the Medicare Act, various Hatch-Waxman litigants
entered reverse payment settlements “parking” the 180-day
marketing exclusivity period.118
The Hatch-Waxman Act
originally provided that the 180-day exclusivity period would be
triggered on the earlier of the date of first commercial marketing of
the generic drug (the “first commercial marketing” trigger) or the
date of a court decision holding the brand firm’s drug patent

112
113
114
115
116
117

See id.
See id. at 332 (citing 2002 FTC STUDY, supra note 103, at 51).
Id.
Id.
2002 FTC STUDY, supra note 103, at 51–52.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2006). The statute states in relevant part:
If the applicant made a certification described in subclause (IV) . . .
the approval shall be made effective immediately unless, before the
expiration of 45 days after . . . the notice . . . is received, an action is
brought for infringement of the patent that is the subject of the
certification and for which information was submitted to the
Secretary . . . before the date on which the application . . . was
submitted. If such an action is brought before the expiration of such
days, the approval shall be made effective upon the expiration of the
thirty-month period . . . .

Id.
118
Apotex, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 187, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d,
Apotex, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 159 F. App’x 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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invalid or not infringed (the “court decision” trigger).119 The FDA
could not approve a subsequent ANDA until the end of the 180day period.120 To delay triggering the 180-day exclusivity period,
NDA holders compensated ANDA filers through settlements.121
This practice created a bottleneck preventing FDA approval of
subsequently filed ANDAs.122
The Medicare Act established “forfeiture events” restricting a
first applicant’s entitlement to exclusivity, including if the first
applicant (1) fails to market within seventy-five days of final FDA
approval or thirty months after submitting its ANDA, whichever is
earlier; (2) fails to market within seventy-five days of a court
decision finding the patent invalid or not infringed, a court signing
a settlement order or consent decree finding the patent invalid or
not infringed, or the NDA holder withdrawing its patent
information from its NDA; (3) withdraws its application or the
FDA considers it withdrawn because it does not meet its
requirements for approval; (4) amends or withdraws the
certifications that qualified it for exclusivity; (5) fails to obtain
tentative FDA approval within the first thirty months of filing,
unless the failure is caused by a change in or a review of the
requirements for approval after filing; (6) enters into an agreement
with another ANDA applicant, the NDA holder, or a patent holder,
and the FTC or DOJ files a complaint that results in the FTC or a
court’s final, unappealable decision (except for a petition to the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari) that the agreement violates
antitrust laws; or (7) no longer qualifies for the 180-day exclusivity
period because all of the patents for which it submitted a
certification have expired.123 The Medicare Act thus curbed
perceived abuses to the 180-day exclusivity period that some
litigants effected through reverse payment settlements.124

119

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (1984) (amended 2003). For the statutory text before
revision by the Medicare Act, see supra note 66.
120
Id.
121
Apotex, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 190.
122
Id.
123
Id.; see also Lietzan & Korn, supra note 62, at 50–51.
124
Apotex, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 190.
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c) Requiring notice to antitrust enforcement agencies
Additionally, the Medicare Act requires any agreement
between a brand-name drug company and generic firm regarding
the manufacturing, marketing, or sale of the drug listed in the
generic’s ANDA to be filed with the FTC and United States
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) for antitrust review.125 In effect,
this requires parties to give notice of reverse payment settlements
to antitrust enforcement agencies.126
3. The Patent Act
The United States Constitution empowers Congress to grant
inventors exclusive monopoly rights to their inventions: “Congress
shall have the power . . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”127 Less than two years after the States ratified the
Constitution in 1788,128 the First Congress during its Second
Session enacted the Patent Act of 1790, setting the conditions for
obtaining a patent.129
Subsequent statutory enactments,
collectively known as the Patent Acts, modified and added to these
conditions.130 The Patent Act of 1952 (the “Patent Act”), as
amended, currently governs patent law.131
The Patent Act provides that “[a] patent shall be presumed to
be valid” and that “[t]he burden of establishing invalidity of a
patent . . . shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”132 In
125

Medicare Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, §§ 1112, 117 Stat. 2066.
See Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 22, at 47.
127
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
128
Paul Rodgers, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 108
(2011).
129
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109–112.
130
See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318–323; Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat.
117; Patent Act of 1839, ch. 88, 5 Stat. 353–355; Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat.
198–217; Patent Act of 1939, ch. 450, 53 Stat. 1212–1213; Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950,
66 Stat. 792–817.
131
See 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq (2006).
132
35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2006). But “[t]he burden always is on the patentee to show
infringement.” Under Sea Indus., Inc. v. Dacor Corp., 833 F.2d 1551, 1557 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (citing Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 758 (Fed. Cir. 1984));
see also Michael A. Carrier, Solving the Drug Settlement Problem: The Legislative
126
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patent infringement litigation, the invalidity defense must “be
proved by clear and convincing evidence.”133 Accordingly, in
Hatch-Waxman litigation, a patent holder enjoys a presumption of
validity, and the ANDA filer must show invalidity by clear and
convincing evidence.134
4. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that “[e]very
contract . . . in restraint of trade . . . among the several States . . . is
declared to be illegal.”135 The Supreme Court has held that
“Congress could not have intended a literal interpretation of the
word ‘every,’” and has instead held that the Sherman Act outlaws
only unreasonable restraints of trade.136 Most restraints are
evaluated under a “rule of reason” standard, under which the fact
finder must make an “elaborate inquiry into the reasonableness” of
a firm’s behavior in the context of a particular industry.137
Rule of reason analysis can entail enormous litigation expenses
and strain judicial resources.138 Thus the Court has developed an
alternative doctrine for agreements that are manifestly
anticompetitive: “[T]here are certain agreements or practices
which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of
any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to
the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their
use.”139 Such agreements are per se illegal under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.140 Several practices have traditionally fallen within
Approach, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 83, 86 n.11 (2009) [hereinafter Carrier, The Legislative
Approach] (citing Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir.
2008)).
133
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011).
134
Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 366, 370
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) aff’d, Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
135
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
136
Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982) (citing United
States v. Joint-Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898)).
137
Id.
138
See id.
139
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
140
Id.
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this category, including “price fixing[,] division of markets[,]
group boycotts[,] and tying arrangements.”141
II. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
On March 25, 2013, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments
in F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc.142 The case seeks to resolve under what
circumstances reverse payment settlements are unreasonable
restraints of trade that violate federal antitrust law. Many courts
and commentators have observed that the Hatch-Waxman Act
creates a climate that encourages reverse payment settlements.143
The Second Circuit subscribed to this view in In re Tamoxifen
Citrate Antitrust Litigation, explaining that under the HatchWaxman regulatory scheme, generic firms file ANDA-IVs
“before . . . spen[ding] substantial sums on the manufacturing,
marketing, or distribution of the potentially infringing generic
drug.”144 Consequently, the first ANDA filer in a patent
infringement action stands to lose little “beyond litigation costs
and the opportunity for future profits from selling the generic
drug,”145 but stands to gain a lucrative 180-day marketing
exclusivity period during which it participates in an effective
141

Id. (citations omitted). A tying arrangement is “an agreement by a party to sell one
product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied)
product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier.”
Id. at 5–6.
142
Transcript of Oral Argument, F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir.
2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-416), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-416.pdf.
143
See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 206 (2d Cir. 2006),
cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1144 (2007); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.,
261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that “because of the generic
manufacturer’s entitlement under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to institute patent
litigation merely by filing an ANDA IV, the statutory scheme has the unintended
consequence of altering the litigation risks of patent lawsuits”). See generally Anjan
Chatterji & Xiang Yu, Why Brand Pharmaceutical Companies Choose to Pay Generics
in Settling Patent Disputes: A Systematic Evaluation of Asymmetric Risks in Litigation,
10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 19 (2011) (arguing that, in light of the asymmetric
litigation risks in Hatch-Waxman litigation, reverse payment settlements need not be
collusive to be rational).
144
Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 206 (emphasis in original).
145
Id. at 206–07.
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duopoly with the original NDA filer.146 Even though the first
filer’s litigation expenses may amount to several millions of
dollars,147 its revenues from the exclusivity period could reach
hundreds of millions of dollars for “blockbuster” drugs.148 Thus, a
generic firm evaluating the potential risks and benefits of filing an
ANDA-IV may rationally decide to roll the dice and trigger a
statutory act of patent infringement.149
The branded patent holder, on the other hand, is in no better
position than before if it prevails in the patent infringement action.
Money damages are not available since the generic firm usually
has not yet entered the market. The patent holder’s benefit is
virtually limited to continued patent protection against that ANDA
challenger.150 On the other hand, if the brand loses the suit, it
relinquishes its patent monopoly.151 Some commentators have
pointed to these “exceedingly” asymmetric litigation risks to
explain the unconventional reverse flow of consideration from the
plaintiff-patent holder to the defendant-generic challenger.152
Other courts and commentators have been more skeptical.153
Many believe reverse payments resemble collusion and reject any
notion that economically rational behavior exonerates antitrust
liability.154 The FTC has stated that “the competition laws exist
146

Id. at 207.
Chatterji & Yu, supra note 143, at 19.
148
Id. at 4. A “blockbuster” drug is a drug that generates more than $1 billion of
revenue per year. See GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31511, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF THE DRUG INDUSTRY AND ITS EFFECTS ON NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT, at 3
n.8 (2009), available at http://policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/18823.pdf.
Examples include “Cipro, Claritin, Paxil, Pravachol, Prilosec, Prozac, and Zoloft.”
Carrier, The Legislative Approach, supra note 132, at 87 (citing 2002 FTC STUDY, supra
note 103, at 14).
149
Chatterji & Yu, supra note 143, at 21.
150
See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 206 (2d Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 551 U.S. 1144 (2007).
151
Id.
152
Chatterji & Yu, supra note 143, at 6.
153
See, e.g., In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 217 (3d Cir. 2012), petition for
cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3090 (Aug. 24, 2012) (No. 12-245), petition for cert. filed, 81
U.S.L.W. 3090 (Aug. 29, 2012) (No. 12-265); Carrier, The Legislative Approach, supra
note 132, at 88.
154
See Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property
Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1758 (2003) (“We do not think it follows that because
147
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precisely to counteract commercial environments that encourage
collusive and anticompetitive behavior.”155 The Third Circuit
recently endorsed this view, criticizing reverse payment
settlements because they “permit the sharing of monopoly rents
between would-be competitors without any assurance that the
underlying patent is valid.”156
Since 2001, several circuit courts have developed legal
standards under which to analyze reverse payment settlements.
Roughly three approaches to evaluating reverse payment
settlements have emerged157: (1) per se illegal treatment (Sixth
Circuit);158 (2) the “scope of the patent” test (Eleventh, Second,
and Federal Circuits);159 and (3) the “quick look” rule of reason
test, which applies a rebuttable presumption of illegality (Third
Circuit).160
A. Per Se Illegal Treatment
In 2003, before the enactment of the Medicare Act, the Sixth
Circuit declared reverse payment settlements per se illegal in In re
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation.161 This case centered on
Cardizem CD, a brand-name prescription drug used to treat angina
and hypertension and prevent heart attack and stroke.162 In 1995,
Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Andrx”), a generic manufacturer,
filed an ANDA-IV seeking FDA approval to manufacture, market,
and sell a generic version of Cardizem CD, which at the time was
manufactured and marketed by Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.
(“HMR”).163 Andrx was the first generic firm to file an ANDAIV, entitling it to the coveted 180 days of marketing exclusivity.164
it is rational for the patentee to agree to an exclusion payment, that payment cannot be
anticompetitive.”).
155
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 28, F.T.C. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298
(11th Cir. 2012), (No. 12-416) (internal quotation marks omitted).
156
K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 216.
157
See Chatterji & Yu, supra note 143, at 23.
158
See infra Part II.A.
159
See infra Part II.B.
160
See infra Part II.C.
161
332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 939 (2004).
162
Id. at 901.
163
Id. at 901–02.
164
Id. at 902.
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In 1996, HMR brought a patent infringement claim against
Andrx.165 As the suit pended in federal court, the FDA issued
tentative approval of Andrx’s ANDA.166 Nine days later, the
parties entered into an agreement, wherein Andrx promised it
would not market a generic version of Cardizem CD upon
receiving final FDA approval or transfer or relinquish its 180-day
exclusivity period to another company.167 In exchange, HMR
agreed to compensate Andrx with $40 million per year, payable
quarterly after the FDA issued final approval, and further agreed to
compensate Andrx $100 million per year to abstain from the
market after a final, unappealable judgment that Andrx did not
infringe HMR’s patent.168 When the thirty-month stay period
ended in 1998 and the FDA issued final approval of Andrx’s
ANDA, HMR began making $10 million quarterly payments,
Andrx did not enter the market, and the 180-day marketing
exclusivity period was not triggered.169 The parties eventually
settled the patent infringement suit in 1999 for a final additional
sum of $50.7 million.170
State law plaintiffs, indirect purchasers, and class
representatives filed complaints against HMR and Andrx alleging
antitrust injuries.171 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged “that but for
the Agreement, specifically the payment of $40 million per year,
Andrx would have brought its generic product to market once it
received FDA approval and at a lower price than the patented
Cardizem CD sold by HMR.”172 In addition, the plaintiffs alleged
that Andrx’s delayed market entry “parked” the start of its 180-day
marketing exclusivity period and blocked “other potential generic
competitors.”173

165
166
167
168
169
170
171

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 902–03.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 903 n.7. A judicial panel on multidistrict litigation consolidated the claims.

Id.
172
173

Id. at 904.
See id.
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The Sixth Circuit held that the HMR-Andrx Agreement “was,
at its core, a horizontal agreement to eliminate competition in the
market for Cardizem CD throughout the entire United States, a
classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade.”174 In addition
to the quarterly payments to refrain from marketing its generic
version of Cardizem CD, the court found dispositive the fact that
“by delaying Andrx’s entry into the market, the Agreement also
delayed the entry of other generic competitors, who could not enter
until the expiration of Andrx’s 180-day period of marketing
exclusivity, which Andrx had agreed not to relinquish or
transfer.”175 At least to the extent that reverse payment settlements
involved “parking” the 180-day exclusivity period, the Sixth
Circuit’s approach was a clear categorical condemnation of such
agreements.
Cases in other circuits, such as In re Tamoxifen Citrate
Antitrust Litigation in the Second Circuit, have openly questioned
the continued vitality of Cardizem after the Medicare Act because
it involved parking the 180-day exclusivity period and blocking
subsequent ANDA filers.176
The Medicare Act of 2003
subsequently established forfeiture events intended to prevent
parking the 180-day exclusivity period, a practice the following
cases did not so nakedly involve.177
B. The Scope of the Patent Test
1. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit articulated the most deferential standard for
evaluating reverse payment settlements in In re Tamoxifen Citrate
This case involved the patent for
Antitrust Litigation.178
tamoxifen, a prescription drug for the treatment of breast cancer.179
In 1987, Imperial Chemical Industries (“ICI”) brought suit against
Barr, a generic manufacturer and the first ANDA-IV filer for
174

Id. at 908.
Id. at 908–09 (citing Arizona v. Maricopa Cmty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 351
(1982)).
176
See, e.g., 466 F.3d 187 (2d. Cir. 2005).
177
See supra Part I.B.2.b.
178
466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2005).
179
Id. at 193.
175
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tamoxifen.180 The district court declared ICI’s tamoxifen patent
invalid after finding ICI had intentionally withheld critical testing
information from the PTO.181 While ICI’s appeal was pending in
the Federal Circuit, the parties entered into a settlement
agreement.182 Zeneca, ICI’s successor-in-interest to the tamoxifen
patent, agreed to compensate Barr with $21 million and a nonexclusive license to sell tamoxifen under Barr’s label if Barr would
change its ANDA to a Paragraph III certification, thereby agreeing
not to sell its generic version of tamoxifen until Zeneca’s patent
expired.183 The parties also agreed that if a subsequent ANDA-IV
challenger prevailed against Zeneca in a patent infringement suit,
Barr could “revert to a paragraph IV ANDA certification.”184
Finally, the parties moved to vacate the district court’s opinion that
Zeneca’s patent was invalid.185 The district court granted the
motion.186
Consumer groups filed lawsuits alleging the Zeneca-Barr
settlement violated antitrust laws.187 The plaintiffs also alleged
that Zeneca and Barr “‘understood’ that if another generic
manufacturer attempted to market a version of tamoxifen, Barr
would seek to prevent the manufacturer from doing so by
attempting to invoke the 180-day exclusivity right possessed by the
first ‘paragraph IV’ filer.”188 The district court upheld the
agreement, and the Second Circuit affirmed.189
The Second Circuit based its analysis on the principle that
courts are “bound to encourage” settlements because settlements
are in the interest of the parties and of the public.190 The court
pointed out that, where there are conflicting patent claims, the
180

Id.
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id.at 193–94.
184
Id. at 194.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 196. A judicial panel on multidistrict litigation consolidated and transferred
the claims to the Eastern District of New York. The complainants then filed a class
action. Id.
188
Id. at 194.
189
Id. at 198–99.
190
Id. at 202 (citing Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2004)).
181
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Sherman Act does not preclude settlements, even though
settlements could harm competition.191 It also recognized that
restricting patent settlements might undermine the purpose of
patent law because it would generate uncertainty and hamper
innovation.192
Turning to reverse payment settlements specifically, the
Second Circuit explicitly rejected applying the per se rule and
explained that reverse payments are a natural byproduct of the
Hatch-Waxman regulatory regime.193 “Hatch-Waxman essentially
redistributes the relative risk assessments and explains the flow of
settlement funds and their magnitude. Because of the HatchWaxman scheme, [the generic challengers] gain[] considerable
leverage in patent litigation . . . .”194 The Second Circuit refused to
“categorically condemn[]” reverse payments in what it perceived
to be a regulatory regime that redistributed litigation risks and
undercut patentee certainty.195
While the Second Circuit conceded that economically rational
behavior is not necessarily lawful,196 it reasoned that a patent
settlement raises antitrust concerns only if the settlement is a
vehicle for avoiding antitrust law.197 Under this reasoning, a large

191

Id. at 202–03 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931); Nestle
Co. v. Chester’s Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 284 (2d Cir. 1985); U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v.
Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 27–29 (1994); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.,
540 F.2d 1215, 1220 (4th Cir. 1976); Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F.
Supp. 2d 986, 991 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (Posner, J., sitting by designation)).
192
Id. at 203.
193
Id. at 205–06 (“[W]e decline to conclude (and repeat that the plaintiffs do not ask us
to conclude) that reverse payments are per se violations of the Sherman Act such that an
allegation of an agreement to make reverse payments suffices to assert an antitrust
violation. We do not think that the fact that the patent holder is paying to protect its
patent monopoly, without more, establishes a Sherman Act violation.”).
194
Id. at 207 (quoting Schering-Plough Corp. v. F.T.C., 402 F.3d 1056, 1074 (11th Cir.
2005)).
195
See id.
196
See id. at 208 (“We agree that even if ‘reverse payments are a natural by-product of
the Hatch-Waxman process,’ it does not follow that they are necessarily lawful.”)
(quoting In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 252
(E.D.N.Y. 2003)).
197
Id. (citing Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991 (N.D.
Ill. 1993) (Posner, J., sitting by designation)). Extending the life of an almost certainly
invalid patent, for example, would raise antitrust concerns. Id. The owner of a weak
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reverse payment settlement would not raise antitrust concerns if
the patentee is only seeking to insure its preexisting property
interests.198 The court conceded again that this rule could have the
effect of permitting settlements that protect “undeserved” patent
monopolies, but determined that succeeding ANDA challengers
would erode a weak patent holder’s monopoly profits and reinstate
competition.199
Finally, the court presented a test for evaluating reverse
payment settlements: An agreement is an antitrust violation only if
it excludes competition beyond the scope of the patent’s
protection.200 As long as competition is restrained within the scope
of the patent monopoly, the agreement is lawful unless the
plaintiffs can show that (1) the patent was procured by fraud on the
PTO or (2) the patent infringement suit is “objectively baseless.”201
Applying this test to the facts of the Zeneca-Barr settlement, the
court held the agreement did not extend the scope of Zeneca’s
tamoxifen patent because it precluded only generic marketing of
tamoxifen, not any other non-infringing product.202 Moreover, the
court distinguished this agreement from that in Cardizem, which
involved Andrx “parking” the 180-day exclusivity period and
blocking subsequent generic competition.203 Here, by changing its
ANDA to a Paragraph III certification, Barr “appeared to” revoke
its eligibility for the exclusivity period.204 Thus the court
concluded that any harm to the plaintiffs was the result of the

patent might “sue its competitors” and “settle[] the suit by licensing them to use its patent
in exchange for their agreeing not to sell the patented product for less than the price
specified in the license . . . [a mask for] fixing prices, in violation of antitrust law.” Id.
198
See id. at 210 (“Whatever the degree of the patent holder’s certainty, there is always
some risk of loss that the patent holder might wish to insure against by settling.”).
199
Id. at 212 (“Every settlement payment to a generic manufacturer reduces the
profitability of the patent monopoly. The point will come when there are simply no
monopoly profits with which to pay the new generic challengers.”).
200
Id. at 213.
201
Id. (citing In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514,
535 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d in part, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d in part sub nom.
Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010)).
202
Id. at 213–14.
203
Id. at 214–15.
204
Id.
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exclusionary power that reposes in a patent monopoly, not antitrust
abuse.205
2. Judge Pooler’s Dissent
Judge Pooler, in a widely cited dissent in Tamoxifen, criticized
the majority’s standard as “insufficiently protective of the
consumer interests safeguarded by the Hatch-Waxman Act and the
antitrust laws.”206 She proposed a more searching scrutiny:
I see no reason why the general standard for
evaluating an anti-competitive agreement, i.e., its
reasonableness, should not govern in this context.
In assessing reasonableness, the fact finder must
consider all the circumstances affecting a restrictive
agreement. Of course, the strength of the patent
must be central to any antitrust analysis involving a
patent. Thus, in assessing the reasonability of a
Hatch-Waxman settlement, I would rely primarily
on the strength of the patent as it appeared at the
time at which the parties settled and secondarily on
(a) the amount the patent holder paid to keep the
generic manufacturer from marketing its product,
(b) the amount the generic manufacturer stood to
earn during its period of exclusivity, and (c) any
ancillary anti-competitive effects of the agreement
including the presence or absence of a provision
allowing the parties to manipulate the generic’s
exclusivity period.207
Judge Pooler’s standard embeds in the antitrust analysis an
evaluation of the strength of the patent.208 Such an evaluation is
not a feature of the majority’s “scope of the patent” test, an
absence that Judge Pooler believed rendered the scope of the patent
test imbalanced in favor of antitrust defendants.209 Applying her
205

Id. at 219–20.
Id. at 224 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
207
Id. at 228 (emphasis added) (citing Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d
50, 56 (2d Cir.1997)).
208
Id.
209
Id. at 221.
206
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standard to the facts of this case, Judge Pooler reasoned that, in
light of the district court finding that Zeneca’s tamoxifen patent
was invalid, the court should have denied the defendants’ 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss and permitted discovery.210
3. Declining to Revisit Tamoxifen
The Second Circuit recently heard an antitrust challenge to a
reverse payment settlement between Bayer, the patentee for the
active ingredient in ciprofloxacin hydrochloride (Cipro), and Barr,
the generic firm that filed the first ANDA-IV to market a generic
version of the drug.211 The circuit panel, which included Judge
Pooler, explained that it was “bound” to apply the standard
adopted in Tamoxifen212 and ruled that the agreement was
lawful.213 But the panel also expressed its concern that Tamoxifen
may have been wrongly decided.214 It offered for support four
reasons—namely, that (1) the United States has urged the Second
Circuit to repudiate Tamoxifen for “inappropriately permitt[ing]
patent holders to contract their way out of a statutorily imposed
risk . . . while claiming antitrust immunity”;215 (2) the incidence of
reverse payment settlements has increased since the Tamoxifen
decision;216 (3) Senator Hatch, one of the bill’s drafters, has
expressed strong disapproval of the agreements;217 and (4) the
Tamoxifen panel may have misinterpreted the Hatch-Waxman
Act.218 At the end of its opinion, the court invited the plaintiffs to
petition for a rehearing en banc.219
210

Id.
Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1606 (2011).
212
Id. at 106.
213
Id. at 110.
214
Id. at 108.
215
Id. at 108–09 (quoting Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s
Invitation at 14–15, Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98
(2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) No. 05-2851-cv(L), 2009 WL 8385027, at *14–15).
216
Id. at 109 (citing Brief of Amicus Curiae the American Antitrust Institute in Support
of Petitioners at 3 (citing 2002 FTC STUDY, supra note 103), Ark. Carpenters Health &
Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) No. 10-762, 2011
WL 63543, at *3).
217
Id. at 109 (citing 148 Cong. Rec. S7565 (July 30, 2002) (remarks of Sen. Hatch)).
218
Id. at 109.
219
Id. at 110.
211
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In September 2010, over Judge Pooler’s strong dissent, the
Second Circuit denied rehearing the case en banc.220 “I think that
our Tamoxifen decision unambiguously deserves reexamination,”
she dissented.221 “It will be up to the Supreme Court or Congress
to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals.”222
4. Before the Supreme Court: F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc.
On December 7, 2012, the Supreme Court granted the
government’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in F.T.C. v. Watson Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.223 The case was renamed to F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc. following
Watson’s acquisition of the Swiss drugmaker Actavis Group in
October 2012.224 The Court’s decision may finally reconcile the
pharmaceutical industry’s unique tension between patent law and
antitrust law, a matter that has concerned the FTC for over a
decade.225
Actavis involves a reverse payment settlement between the
NDA holder for AndroGel, Solvay Pharmaceuticals, and two
generic manufacturers, then Watson Pharmaceuticals and Paddock
Laboratories.226 AndroGel is a prescription topical gel used to
treat low testosterone in adult males.227 Although the patent for the
synthetic testosterone used in AndroGel expired years ago, Watson
220

Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 625 F.3d 779 (2d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 781.
222
Id. at 782.
223
677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Dec. 7,
2012) (No. 12-416).
224
Press Release, Actavis, Watson Announces New Name—Actavis—for Global
Operations (Oct. 31, 2012), available at http://ir.actavis.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=65778&
p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1752588&highlight=. Oral arguments for Actavis took place on
March 25, 2013. Transcript of Oral Argument, F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 677 F.3d 1298
(11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-416),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12416.pdf.
225
J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Pharmaceutical Patent
Settlements and the Supreme Court, Address Before the CBI’s 2nd Annual Life Sciences
Compliance, Legal, and Regulatory Congress (Sep. 21, 2012), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/120921cbipharmaspeech.pdf.
226
Watson, 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Dec.
7, 2012) (No. 12-416).
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Id. at 1303.
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obtained patent protection for a gel formulation of the drug in
2003.228 Four months after the PTO granted Solvay’s patent
application in 2003, Watson and Paddock filed separate ANDAIVs for the drug with the FDA.229 Watson, the first filer, became
eligible for the 180-day marketing exclusivity period.230 Solvay
brought a patent infringement suit against both companies within
forty-five days, triggering the thirty-month stay provision.231
When the thirty-month stay on the FDA’s approval of Watson’s
ANDA expired in 2006, the suit was still pending in federal district
court.232
Watson estimated “that its generic version of AndroGel would
sell for about twenty-five percent of the price of branded
AndroGel, which could decrease the sales of branded AndroGel by
ninety percent and cut Solvay’s profits by $125 million per
year.”233 Before the district court could rule on Watson and
Paddock’s motions for summary judgment, which were fully
briefed, the parties agreed to settle the suit.234 The generic
manufacturers agreed not to market generic versions of AndroGel
until 2015—five years before Solvay’s patent would expire—in
exchange for multimillion-dollar yearly payments.235
After the settlements were reported to the FTC pursuant to the
Medicare Act, the agency brought an antitrust action under 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) against the parties.236 The FTC “urged [the
court] to adopt a rule that an exclusion payment is unlawful if,
viewing the situation objectively as of the time of the settlement, it
is more likely than not that the patent would not have blocked
generic entry earlier than the agreed-upon entry date.”237 Under

228

Id. at 1304.
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
Id. at 1305.
234
Id.
235
Id.
236
Id. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) states that “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby
declared unlawful.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
237
Watson, 677 F.3d at 1312 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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this approach, the FTC would have the burden of proving that
Solvay was unlikely to prevail in the underlying patent
infringement litigation. According to the FTC, since Solvay’s
AndroGel patent was “vulnerable” at the time of the settlement, it
was “unlikely to prevail” in the patent infringement suit and the
FTC could state an antitrust claim.238
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the FTC’s approach for several
reasons.239 First, it declared that the FTC’s position is inconsistent
with the circuit’s precedents. “Our decisions focus on the potential
exclusionary effect of the patent, not the likely exclusionary
effect.”240 In other words, so long as the patent for the drug was
active, the court refused to inquire into its actual exclusionary
power. Second, the court decided that “retroactively predicting
from a past perspective a future that never occurred is . . .
perilous.”241 It reasoned that assessing the infringement claim as
of the time of settlement would impose a profound burden on
litigants and scarce judicial resources, and would be unreliable
anyway.242
Finally, Watson explained that the FTC’s approach would
require the circuit courts to make substantive determinations for
which they are not institutionally equipped.243 “We are illequipped to make a judgment about the merits of a patent
infringement claim . . . . The FTC’s approach is in tension with
Congress’ decision to have appeals involving patent issues decided
by the Federal Circuit.”244 The Federal Circuit has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over patent cases.245 Thus, the court struck
down the FTC’s approach for (1) being inconsistent with
precedent, (2) promoting unstable judicial policy, and (3)
generating tension with Congress’s decision that the Federal
Circuit hears patent appeals.246
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246

Id. at 1313.
Id.
Id. at 1312–13.
Id. at 1313.
Id. at 1314.
Id. at 1315.
Id.
Id. at 1314 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1)).
See id. at 1313–15.
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Instead, the court reiterated the scope of the patent test.
“[A]bsent sham [Hatch-Waxman patent infringement] litigation or
fraud in obtaining the patent, a reverse payment settlement is
immune from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects
fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.”247
Because the FTC’s complaint attempted to state an antitrust claim
by retroactively assessing, as of the time of the settlement, the
likelihood Solvay would prevail in the underlying patent
infringement suit, it did not state a plausible federal antitrust
claim.248 The court granted the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss249 and later denied the FTC’s petition for a rehearing en
banc.250
The FTC filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on October 4,
2012,251 presenting the question of “[w]hether reverse-payment
agreements are per se lawful unless the underlying patent litigation
was a sham or the patent was obtained by fraud (as the court below
held), or instead are presumptively anticompetitive and unlawful
(as the Third Circuit has held).”252 In its petition, the FTC argued
that the Supreme Court should overturn Watson because its
approach “effectively equates a brand-name manufacturer’s
allegation of infringement with a judgment in the manufacturer’s
favor.”253 It explained that this outcome is incorrect for several
reasons. First, defendants usually win patent infringement suits.254
In the cases litigated to final judgment, generic competitors prevail
seventy-five percent of the time.255 Second, Congress clearly
intended through the Hatch-Waxman Act and subsequent
amendments for brand-name drug companies and generic
manufacturers to use the judicial process to resolve patent

247

Id. at 1312.
Id.
249
Id. at 1315.
250
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, F.T.C. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298
(11th Cir. 2012), (No. 12-416).
251
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, F.T.C. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th
Cir. 2012), (No. 12-416).
252
Id. at I.
253
Id. at 11.
254
Id.
255
Id. at 18 (citing 2002 FTC STUDY, supra note 103, at 19–20).
248
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infringement claims.256 Third, federal antitrust laws condemn
“naked agreements not to compete”257 as per se unreasonable
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.258
C. The “Quick Look” Rule of Reason Test
The petition described Watson as a superior vehicle for
resolving the circuit split because Watson involves a federal
agency enforcement action, which gives the government greater
control over the litigation.259 K-Dur, on the other hand, is a private
class action.260 Moreover, FTC Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch
has remarked that Watson is superior because it was decided on a
motion to dismiss, and therefore “presents a pure issue of law,”
unlike K-Dur, which was decided on summary judgment.261
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation marked a distinct split in the
circuit courts’ trend toward the “scope of the patent” test.262 The
Third Circuit rejected this test because it “assumed away” the
question being litigated in the underlying patent suit.263 Instead,
the court advocated a “quick look” rule of reason analysis. Under
this test, the fact finder treats “any payment from a patent holder to
a generic patent challenger who agrees to delay entry into the
market as prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of
trade, which could be rebutted by showing that the payment (1)
was for a purpose other than delayed entry or (2) offers some procompetitive benefit.”264
The Third Circuit derived its approach to reverse payment
settlements from the conventional “rule of reason” analysis in

256

Id. at 11.
Id.
258
See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22, F.T.C. v. Watson
Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), (No. 12-416)..
259
See id. at 12 (“This case is a superior vehicle for addressing the question presented
because it is brought by an agency charged by Congress with challenging unfair methods
of competition . . . .”).
260
See id.
261
See Rosch, supra note 225, at 15.
262
See Carrier, Why the “Scope of the Patent” Test Cannot Solve the Drug Patent
Settlement Problem, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2012).
263
K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214.
264
Id. at 218.
257
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antitrust jurisprudence.265 Classically, “the finder of fact must
decide whether the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable
restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of
factors.”266 This involves, according to K-Dur, three parts:
First, the plaintiff must show that the challenged
conduct has produced anti-competitive effects
within the market. If the plaintiff meets the initial
burden, “the burden shifts to the defendant to show
that the challenged conduct promotes a sufficiently
pro-competitive objective.” Finally, the plaintiff
can rebut the defendant’s purported pro-competitive
justification by showing that the restraint is not
reasonably necessary to achieve the pro-competitive
objective.267
The quick look test under the rule of reason represented a
compromise between the rule of reason test, under which plaintiffs
must “make a full showing of anticompetitive effects in the
market,” and the per se rule, where market effects need not be
examined. The quick look rule of reason test is used when “an
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics
could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets” by virtue of their
nature.268
Here, the court justified applying this test by
“embrac[ing]” the “common sense conclusion that a payment
flowing from the innovator to the challenging generic firm may
suggest strongly the anticompetitive intent of the parties entering
the agreement.”269
While admitting that the quick look test does not encourage
settlement to the same degree as the scope of the patent test, the
court stated that “the judicial preference for settlement . . . should
not displace countervailing policy objectives or, in this case,
Congress’s determination . . . that litigated patent challenges are
265

Id. at 209 (citing State Oil v. Khan, 552 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)).
Id.
267
Id. (quoting United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668–69 (3d Cir. 1993)).
268
Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
269
K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Andrx Pharms.,
Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 809 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
266
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necessary to protect consumers from unjustified monopolies by
brand name drug manufacturers.”270 In light of Hatch-Waxman’s
structure and legislative record, Congress’s objective was to
increase litigated challenges to pharmaceutical patents, an aim
reverse payment settlements frustrate. 271
The court was also skeptical of Tamoxifen’s conclusion that
subsequent ANDA-IV filers would restore competition after a
reverse payment settlement.272 It noted that only the first ANDAIV challenger is eligible for the 180-day exclusivity period.273
Moreover, a brand-name drug company’s profit margin could be
wide enough to “pay off a whole series of challengers rather than
suffer the possible loss of its patent through litigation.”274
Contrary to the Tamoxifen panel, the Third Circuit believed
settlements likely reduced subsequent generic competition.
III. RESOLUTION: A PATENT-CENTRIC STANDARD OF ANTITRUST
REVIEW
A. The Hatch-Waxman Act Neither Prohibits nor Endorses
Settlements
The Hatch-Waxman Act does not expressly prohibit
settlements in a patent infringement suit. Congress enacted the Act
for two competing policy reasons: (1) to increase the availability of
low cost generic drugs, and (2) to increase incentives for
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.275 To promote generic
competition, the Act provided generic firms a safe harbor
provision, an Abbreviated New Drug Application for streamlined
FDA approval, and a 180-day marketing exclusivity period for the
first applicant to submit to the FDA a “substantially complete”
ANDA-IV.276 To promote innovation in the pharmaceutical
270

Id. at 217.
Id.
272
Id. at 215.
273
Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)).
274
Id. (citing King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 514,
521–22 (E.D. Pa. 2010), abrogated by K-Dur, 686 F.3d 197).
275
See supra Part I.B.1.
276
See supra Part I.B.1.a.
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industry, the Act provided a patent term extension to allow patent
proprietors time to recoup their research and development costs,
non-patent marketing exclusivity to the first NDA applicant to
obtain approval for an NCE, and a thirty-month stay of FDA
approval for a patent infringement challenge to a generic firm’s
ANDA-IV.277 It did not, and still does not, prohibit settlements in
a patent infringement suit.278
The Act reflects a careful balance struck by Congress, a
balance that some commentators fear has been upset by reverse
payment settlements.279 But the six prominent provisions in
Hatch-Waxman that this Note has highlighted are each designed to
remedy a preexisting, congressionally identified problem.280
Congress provided the patent term extension, for instance, to
restore patent terms that had then been effectively eroded by FDA
requirements and approval processes.281 It introduced the ANDA
to streamline the FDA approval process for generics and avoid
“needlessly costly, duplicative” clinical trials.282 It provided nonpatent marketing exclusivity to drugs that introduce new active
ingredients to encourage research and development,283 while
granting a 180-day marketing exclusivity period to the first
ANDA-IV applicant to encourage generic challenges.284 Finally, it
granted generic firms safe harbor while they conduct experiments
reasonably related to FDA approval,285 while providing an
automatic thirty-month stay of FDA approval to patent holders
who bring timely patent infringement suits.286 In 2003, when
Congress amended the Hatch-Waxman Act, it only required
settlements to be filed with the FTC and DOJ for review.287
B. The Circuits Have Not Resolved the Conflict Between Patent
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287

See supra Part I.B.1.b.
See supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.1.
See supra Part I.B.1.b.i.
See supra Part I.B.1.a.ii.
See supra Part I.B.1.b.ii.
See supra Part I.B.1.a.iii.
See supra Part I.B.1.a.i.
See supra Part I.B.1.b.iii.
See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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and Antitrust Law
The Third Circuit’s presumptive illegality approach in K-Dur is
unsuitable in light of Hatch Waxman’s silence regarding
settlements.288 The court improperly forces the parties in the
patent infringement suit to litigate their case to final judgment or
settle without a reverse payment.289 But the uncertainty of
litigation and potential consequences of an adverse outcome to the
plaintiff-patent proprietor, relative to the potential consequences of
an adverse outcome to the defendant-patent challenger, help
explain how a reverse payment can be rational, rather than
unreasonable.290
On the other hand, the Second Circuit’s “scope of the patent”
test approach in Tamoxifen is no more satisfactory. As K-Dur
correctly criticizes, the Tamoxifen test effectively “assumes” that
the underlying patent is valid, and asks instead whether the parties’
settlement falls within the “scope of the patent.”291 If an
agreement falls within the scope of the patent, it poses no antitrust
concern; if it does not, then the court applies antitrust scrutiny.292
But if the patent is not valid in the first instance, then it has no
scope at all.293 The primary beneficiaries of this test are those who
hold weak patents.294
C. The Supreme Court Should Adopt a Patent-Centric Standard of
Antitrust Review
Appropriate antitrust analysis of reverse payment settlements
must subject the patent to scrutiny. The quick look test disregards
the patent and the scope of the patent test assumes its validity.
Only Judge Pooler’s test, articulated in her dissent in Tamoxifen,
recommends evaluating the strength of the patent at the time of the
reverse payment settlement.295 After evaluating the patent’s

288
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290
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See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 262–274 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 143–149 and accompanying text.
See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 200–205 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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strength, a court could then conclude whether the reverse payment
settlement terms were unreasonable under the Sherman Act.296
This approach harmonizes the exclusive principles of patent law
with the procompetitive principles of antitrust law.
The Tamoxifen case presented a relatively simple evaluation of
the strength of the patent—there, at the time the parties entered
into the settlement at issue, the district court had recently ruled that
Zeneca’s tamoxifen patent was invalid because the NDA filer had
withheld critical testing information from the PTO.297 The
question remains how Judge Pooler would have evaluated the
strength of the patent in the absence of the district court’s ruling, as
she does not offer a test for how to evaluate strength of a patent.
Evaluating the strength of a patent is difficult to pinpoint with
precision and may be unknowable to the patentee itself, who may
enter into multimillion-dollar settlements to insure against random
outcomes.298 But the strength of a patent is critical to determining
whether an agreement is anticompetitive.299 An evaluation of
patent strength is therefore a necessary feature to any standard of
antitrust review for reverse payment settlements. Determining
which factors are relevant to the evaluation should be left to caseby-case adjudication.
The court of competent jurisdiction to review patent strength is
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit
has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all patent cases. This
grant of exclusive jurisdiction reflects a congressional choice to
have experts evaluate questions pertaining to technical evidence.
CONCLUSION
The decade-long debate over the legality of reverse payment
settlements has had its day in Court. This Note has argued that any
standard of antitrust review for reverse payment settlements must
involve an evaluation of the patent’s strength at the time of
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See supra Part I.B.4.
See supra notes 181–192 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra notes 179–185.
See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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settlement. The Federal Circuit is the proper court to review patent
strength evaluations given Congress’s decision to have appeals
involving patent issues reviewed by the Federal Circuit. This
would give effect to the legislative intent of the Hatch-Waxman
Act while preserving a meaningful place for patent law and
antitrust law in the pharmaceutical industry.

